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Abstract 
 
The aim of the present article is to show that the relation esoteric-exoteric is 
intrinsec to philosophy. For Hegel, mistery and esoterism are categories 
related to the finite and so, with the incomplete reflection of the spirit in 
himself. The speculative philosophy is oriented towards the ideal of complete 
(vollständigt) revelation of the object and so, towards an intrinsec exoteric 
character of philosophical reflection. 
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1.  The Place of Mystery  
 
  At the beginning of his book Kabbalah and Interpreta-
tion, Moshe Idel gives a definition of the hermeneutical practice 
which makes Jewish hermeneutics of the post biblical period 
possible; he speaks of arcanization, defined as a ”secretive un-
derstanding of canonical texts understood as pointing to these 
realms in allusive ways: anagrammatic, numerical, allegorical 
or symbolic” (Idel 2002, 1). Two moments are the landmarks of 
this process. The former is that of “extending the relevance of 
the canonic text” to various domains: cosmology, psychology, 
theosophy, etc. The latter, which is the actual interpretive one, 
consists of developing complex hermeneutic techniques that 
master and account for this extended relevance. The hermeneu-
tic presupposition of the Jewish post biblical tradition is the 
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following: “Secrets are commensurable to the methods that will 
solve the enigma implied in the secrets” (Idel 2002, 2). 
  It is interesting to note that arcanization is seen in this 
particular context not as a simple interpreting game, but rather 
as a manner of creating tradition and, moreover, as a phe-
nomenological mode of the sacred. According to M. Idel, a pro-
liferation of the interpretive techniques is connected to a larger 
religious phenomenon, that of the “textualization” of religious 
life. During the post biblical age, revelation shifts from the em-
phasis on the level of the world to the level of the text. God 
expresses Himself through words, the sacred text becomes the 
place where religious life is put at stake. Hermeneutics thus 
becomes the privileged manner of assuming the connection with 
the sacred, while mystery is its fundamental category. On the 
one hand, it is a “systemic feature of the sacred”, a name given 
to the absolute of the sacred. The sacred retains its difference 
from the mundane by hiding itself, which results in the labyrin-
thine creation of the text. On the other hand, however, “the 
special status of a text is the feeling of necessity to adopt it in a 
later period and to adapt it to that period.” (Idel 2002, 6). 
Arcanization meets the need to open the text, of increasing not 
only its systemic relevance, but also its temporal relevance, in 
relation to the renewed question – and danger – that time 
carries in itself. Hence, there are two manners of arcanization 
mentioned by M. Idel, i.e. systemic arcanization, derived from 
”the nature” of the sacred, and critical arcanization, in relation 
with its historical condition. 
  The place where an explanation of the mystery and of 
the esoteric practices accompanying it can originate is the 
mystic tradition, that is the Jewish tradition in this case. 
Paradoxically, the consequence of arcanization is not a 
”weakening” of the interpreter, whose task is to reconstitute a 
meaning starting from its symptoms, but rather that of 
assuming an infinite horizon, in a progressive perpetuation and 
cohabitation with it.  
  On the contrary, another landmark of the hermeneutics 
of mystery is represented by Johannes Chladenius who belongs 
to the Western tradition. For this author, mystery is scantiness, 
not abundance. Firstly, the obscurity of the text derives from META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (2) / 2009 
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the manner it is transmitted, and eliminated by the criticism 
exerted on it. Secondly, obscurity can persist through the inher-
ent quality of the text placed in a horizon which is historically 
different from that of the interpreter. Understanding the 
author’s viewpoint (Sehe-Punkt), his world is actually the most 
important element of the hermeneutical exercise. This pro-
gresses through the accumulation of knowledge, through the 
explanation of implicit concepts that make the author express 
himself in a certain way. Interpreting is thus reduced to ren-
dering in an explicit manner what the text contains implicitly; 
this implicit aspect, which is not uttered or assumed, is the 
element that differentiates it from any other. In the case of the-
ology, when relying on the interpretation of the Holy Scrip-
tures, the general rules of interpreting are not applicable as 
they are in the case of lay texts. However, through interpretive 
exercise, they too can be brought closer to perfection and be-
come useful in this manner, as Chladenius says in paragraph 
no. 189 of Einleitung zur richtigen Auslegung vernünftiger 
Reden und Schriften (Leipzig, 1742). For Chladenius and, as a 
matter of fact, for the entire tradition of Enlightenment herme-
neutics, mystery, the obscure locus represents an obstacle. It is 
not assumed as such, while reduced to the difference between 
the world of the author (of the text) and the world of the inter-
preter. In the case of Biblical hermeneutics, in spite of the dif-
ference resulting from the fact that the sacred text is revealed, 
interpreting is reduced to the same task of diminishing histori-
cal difference. Interpreting is thus oriented not towards “living” 
within the horizon of the mystery, but rather towards reducing 
it for practical or theoretical purposes. According to Dannhauer, 
the good interpreter, is (considered through the stand point of 
mystical hermeneutics that was introduced in the beginning of 
this article) a weak interpreter. 
 
2.  Philosophy between the Esoteric and the Exoteric. 
Hegel 
 
  The two manners in which mystery can be assumed – as 
the “transcendental element” and as the horizon of the herme-
neutic task, can also be discussed from the point of view of two Ioan Alexandru Tofan / On the Possibility of Mystery. Philosophy and Esotericism 
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concepts pertaining to the “philosophy” that accompanies them. 
Once philosophy – at the end of modernity – understands its 
task from the point of view of the process of interpretation and 
not from that of substantiation, the relation between the exo-
teric and esoteric principle is reopened. One does no longer 
speak about a cultural relation, defined by the interconnection 
between philosophy and its “public”, but rather about a 
systematic relation which starts from the “role” mystery plays 
in the horizon of the text. Philosophy takes on either of the two 
positions related to the mystery of the word that have been 
drafted in the previous section.  
   A good instance of author in this respect is Hegel. As a 
critic of the Enlightenment, which he understands as a cultural 
form placed under the sign of abstract intellect, Hegel places 
himself in a paradigm that opposes mystery. With Hegel, the 
idea of philosophy is linked to that of “clarity”. In the history of 
philosophy, for instance, Hegel speaks about spirit as a univer-
sal spirit whose substantiation is neither nature, nor the forms 
of individual conscience, as in the case of the finite spirit, but 
rather the rational form that the historical world, art or a 
people’s religion takes. Under all these shapes, the spirit 
becomes an object for itself and returns to itself through 
philosophy, seen as a form of knowledge of this substantial 
spirituality. Consequently, “philosophy is the thought of its 
age”. “The determined form of a philosophy is contemporary to 
a certain form to the peoples from which this philosophy 
emerges (...).”(Hegel 1971, 73) In other words, the form that a 
philosophy takes depends on the stage in the evolution of the 
spirit it “fulfills”. Considering that the substantial form of an 
age is its content, philosophy becomes the specific form that 
this content takes, when it sees itself as having a spiritual 
content. The essentially historical nature of philosophy can 
thus be explained: it is the historical form of an age, “adopted” 
by thought and assumed at a spiritual level. Hegel speaks of 
philosophy as of the central element of an age which captures 
its inner logic, thus allowing to be transcended. “Therefore 
philosophy is an already subsequent feature of the spirit, it is 
the inner birthplace of the spirit which will later move on to 
truly creative activity.” (Hegel 1971, 75). Defined as knowledge META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (2) / 2009 
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of spiritual substantiality, philosophy becomes a locus of the 
passage from one age to the next, from one historical world to 
the next. 
  The same idea also appears in Lectures on the Philoso-
phy of History, where Hegel speaks about the death of a nation: 
this can only occur when the nation starts to “be creative in 
philosophy”, becoming aware of its own spiritual principle as an 
impulse of its own history and opposed to this very principle. As 
for the definition of philosophy in Lectures on the Philosophy of 
History, it is convenient to remark that, by considering philoso-
phy to be the knowledge of the spiritual principle of a world, of 
an age, Hegel also considers it as the linking element between 
the forms of the spirit, completing a world, but at the same time 
also containing the principle of a new world: “We shall thus see 
that the essence of Hellenistic philosophy was actualized in the 
Christian world.” (Hegel 1971, 75).  
  In the lectures that I refer to, the concept of philosophy 
is, therefore, related by Hegel to a certain configuration of a 
historical world. On the one hand, this configuration is not 
defined outside history, the thought is not unrelated to the con-
text in which it is formed – in this case, it would be abstract, i.e. 
a representation of the intellect and not a concept pertaining to 
reason (Logic) – it is rather in a provisional explanation, the 
intelligible form of the historical world. On the other hand, this 
form is not an instantaneous replication of the data of a world 
at the level of thinking, but a denial of these data, a reflex that 
opposes its immediate character through problematization, 
thus projecting them beyond their level. ”Although philosophy, 
seen as thought, as understanding (begreiffen) of the spirit of 
its age, has an a priori nature, and it is also a result to the 
same extent; thought ensures, is a product, a live activity that 
produces itself. This activity contains in itself the essential 
instance of a negation: to create equal means to destroy.” (Hegel 
1971, 71). This idea belonging to Hegel is self-obvious. The 
“great” philosophies in the course of history occur in times of 
decadence for people. Hegel also states that “taking refuge in 
thought” begins when the substantial forms of the spirit of the 
world enter a crisis, when they can no longer offer support to 
activities in that world. Philosophy, as Hegel remarks, repre-Ioan Alexandru Tofan / On the Possibility of Mystery. Philosophy and Esotericism 
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sents the reconciliation within the ideal world, beyond the 
forms of substantial life. The Greek philosophers – Hegel’s 
reference is uncertain at this point – no longer take part in the 
life of the community, hence the public imputations associated 
with their activity. This reconciliation within the world of 
thought is not abstract, however, it is not an alternative to the 
real world. If it were so, then philosophy would result from an 
alien principle, different from the one which governs the other 
spiritual creations of that age. However, as we have seen, Hegel 
is in favor of the opposite position. “For this reason, the rela-
tionship between political history, state institutions, art, 
religion, etc. and philosophy is not a cause-effect type of 
relation, meaning that these forms are not rational for 
philosophy or, on the contrary, philosophy is not their 
foundation, but they all have a common root, i.e. the spirit of 
the age.” (Hegel 1971, 74). The problem raised here is to specify 
the connection between philosophy and the other forms of the 
spirit of the age, so that this connection explains, on the one 
hand, how it becomes inseparable from these forms and how it 
transcends them, on the other hand. The instance that Hegel 
discusses most extensively is the relationship between 
philosophy and religion. 
  From a historical point of view, the relationship between 
philosophy and religion can be considered to have several con-
figurations, dialectically ordered by Hegel. An initial instance is 
that of oriental religions. In their case, philosophy and religion 
are inseparable, since both focus on absolute rationality seen as 
a “wisdom”, a soteriologic technique. The unmediated relation 
between philosophy and religion accounts for the persistence, 
within a religion, of a set of “philosophemes”, statements and 
concepts that are the domain of philosophy, but which can be 
found now as religious representations. An example is the 
theme of Mithras the intercessor and the relation between Good 
and Evil as an opposite pair of divine principles in the Persian 
religion. However, such a relation between philosophy and 
religion cannot be considered as ground for understanding the 
nature of philosophy. The mythological form taken by the reli-
gious idea is not indifferent to the content, but it alters it: the 
finite form of the representations obscures the thought instead 
of revealing it. ”The presentation of thought in a sensitive form META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (2) / 2009 
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always is inadequate...” (Hegel 1971, 103). The second historical 
form of the relation, occurring in several versions, is that of 
philosophy being defined as opposed to religion. An example is 
the Greek philosophers’ attitude towards popular religion. 
Christianity brings along other configurations of this opposi-
tion. First of all, the ”historical pattern” that Hegel uses at this 
point is that of succession, i.e. scholastic philosophy – the phi-
losophy of Enlightenment – German idealism. This succession 
repeats – in terms of the Western world – the logic of the his-
tory of religion in general. The first stage – Scholastic philoso-
phy – corresponds to Eastern religion as far as the relationship 
between religion and philosophy is concerned: they are in a 
relation of abstract identity, which does not facilitate the com-
plete understanding of either term. The Enlightenment raises 
the problem that absorbed Hegel’s attention as early as the 
Jena papers; it is the relation between faith and reason and the 
opposition between them to be more precise which he argued by 
using the instruments of both philosophy and theology. Within 
this relation, thought is conceived according to the fashion of 
the intellect, the faculty of finite knowledge. Hegel also remarks 
that, in this manner, neither philosophy, nor theology are in 
agreement with their own nature. The criticism of Enlighten-
ment from previous works is a proof. The third position is that 
of “thinking which knows in itself what the Church admits as 
being the truth” (Hegel 1971, 113). It is the position of specula-
tive idealism, which also justifies Hegel’s view on philosophy. A 
feature of this instance is the fact that philosophy appears as a 
“testimony of the spirit” in the content of religion. The rational 
element is the link between the two modes of the spirit. The 
difference lies in the form of this rationality: in the case of phi-
losophy, this form is the concept, while religion takes the form 
of the unmediated modes of thought: representation, feeling, 
piety, etc. As Hegel further on remarks, the difference is not 
abstract: philosophy makes use of representations – the specu-
lative concept can be only conceived as meditation on represen-
tation, as shown in The Logic – while in the case of religion, 
thought cannot be said to be totally absent. 
  To Hegel, the genuine difference is a discrimination 
among the various phases of the truth and not the act of 
opposing these phases for bearing the seeds of conflict. The Ioan Alexandru Tofan / On the Possibility of Mystery. Philosophy and Esotericism 
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central phrase of this debate is that of “testimony of the spirit”, 
which I will only outline here to return extensively to in the 
following section. “Man must embrace a religion. Which is the 
fundament of his belief? Christianity states: the fundament is 
the testimony of the spirit on this content.” (Hegel 1971, 93). In 
its turn, the testimony of the spirit is achieved only within the 
concept. The concept is the entity that unifies the two sides of 
religious conscience: an understanding of the absolute as exter-
nal and objective, on the one hand and the participation to the 
“Last Supper” (Hegel 1971, 94-5). through cult and piety, on the 
other hand. The truth of religion expressed in the form of 
mysteries – also called dogmas in Christianity – essentially 
separates the religious community from other communities and 
creates its identity within this opposition. The opposition is 
reproduced at another level, too: at the same time, it becomes 
an opposition between thought regarded as abstract intellect 
and pure faith expressing adherence to dogmas. Hegel’s concept 
of philosophy transcends this opposition between faith and the 
intellect, an opposition which lies at the basis of all tensions 
that especially define the modern era.  
  Within the context of the present paper, the text from 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy can be rightfully called 
upon, since it is a model regarding the manner in which the 
philosophical concept operates, the way in which it works 
within the framework of Hegel’s discourse. History is the con-
text which limits and defines “conceptualization” or, better still, 
the concept as a figure of the discourse of speculative philoso-
phy: in fact, this operation is the self-suspension of the positive 
nature of the forms of the spirit regarded as forms of history. 
“The testimony of the spirit” fully achieved by the philosophical 
concept is identical with the process of removing the positive 
character from the finite representations of conscience as forms 
of the “objective” spirit (in Hegel’s terms from The Encyclope-
dia) that provides them: religion, art, science. How can this 
process of “de-positivization” of representation in the concept be 
further understood? An appeal to The Logic is inevitable at this 
point. 
  As Hegel points out in the first part of the Encyclopedia, 
the representation is the unmediated form of thought, funda-
mentally marked by two features: singularity and reciprocal META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (2) / 2009 
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exteriority. Hegel gives examples: feelings, intuitions, images – 
as far as we are aware of them – are representations which, 
given their unmediated form that they bestow on the content, 
turn it into something finite. Hence Hegel’s critique of a phi-
losophy of representation that takes the absolute as its object. 
Emphasizing the contradictions of such a philosophy can be 
actually equaled with the critique of traditional metaphysics in 
Hegel’s entire work. However thought is defined as the medi-
ated form of thinking, as a result of reflexivity. As determina-
tion of the process of thinking, the concept is infinite  since 
thinking does not relate to its exterior through reflexivity. The 
concept is thus the form of thinking whose object is not exterior 
to itself. At the same time, the concept is also concrete. “Since 
thinking seeks to create a concept about things, this concept 
(along with its most unmediated forms, the judgment and the 
syllogism) cannot consist of determinations or of relations that 
would be alien and exterior to things.” (Hegel 1970b, 81). A 
synonym of concept in its speculative meaning is, therefore, the 
term “objective thought.” From a speculative point of view, 
thinking is not limited to a mere faculty of knowledge. Conse-
quently, it would relapse into the limitations of an opposition, 
namely that between the subject and the object. Ergo thinking 
has a double universal nature: that of the self and that of 
things, and only together can the two access their truth, 
according to Hegel’s speculative philosophy.  
  Hegel’s distinction between representation and concept 
is of essence for the definition of philosophy seen as a manner of 
considering objects through thinking. The task is subsequently 
specified: it is not directly about thought – concept – in philoso-
phy, but rather about the transformation of representation into 
concept. The mediation of the concept makes philosophy the 
absolute form of speculative thinking. The issue raised at this 
point for philosophy is that of not being understood outside 
Hegel’s ultimate reference, which is the speculative. Therefore, 
emphasizing the essentially correlative side of the philosophical 
object is necessary: the object is not the concept in an abstract 
sense as much as the transformation of representation into con-
cept. The relationship between representation and concept is 
not accidental: representation is not the subjective starting 
point of thinking, it is the unmediated reproducing of itself Ioan Alexandru Tofan / On the Possibility of Mystery. Philosophy and Esotericism 
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through the mediation of concept. At the level of the forms of 
thinking, the concept, as an object and medium of speculative 
philosophy, is mainly a reflected representation, therefore 
transformed within philosophy. What is produced is thus 
informed as a restoration of the traditional content of philoso-
phy: “only through the mediation of a change does the true 
nature of the object become conscious to us.” (Hegel 1970 b, 78). 
At this point, the question is how can the mediated nature of the 
concept be made visible in the discourse? The answer, in terms 
of Hegel’s logic, is that the truth of the concept is judgment and 
syllogism. As for the broader issue of philosophy, Hegel leaves 
traces which can be identified as the defining features of 
speculative philosophy. 
Among these traces, the most important one is under-
standing philosophy as a system. The relationship between 
philosophy and the system is not a historic accident. That 
speculative philosophy is a systematic philosophy means for 
Hegel that the systematic character is a necessary determina-
tion of philosophy which is seen as necessary. “The science (of 
the Absolute, author’s notes) is mainly a system, since truth, 
being of a concrete nature, exists to the extent to which it grows 
in itself and is then reunited with itself, retaining this unity; in 
other words, this is to the extent to which it becomes a totality; 
only through the differentiation and determination of these 
differences can the necessity of these differences be compre-
hended, as well as the freedom of totality.” (Hegel 1970 b, 59). 
With Hegel, the system is opposed to a rhapsodic enumeration 
of items of knowledge. To the same extent, it is also different 
from the axiomatic way of thinking, characterized through the 
arbitrariness – therefore the subjective and hence limited 
nature – of the principle. For Hegel, the system can be defined 
as the logic of the determinations that the content itself poses, 
as the self-explanatory presentation of the contents of philoso-
phical knowledge. Therefore, for Hegel the system is not 
defined extensively, as a sum of items of knowledge, but 
dynamically. The moments of the system cross each other, as 
they are not joined according to an external principle. “Each 
circle (part of the philosophical system author’s note), as it is 
not totality itself, goes beyond the limits of the element that META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (2) / 2009 
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defines it and lays the foundations of a broader sphere.” (Hegel 
1970b, 60). As Hegel points out, the idea or thought that is 
thinking of itself, appears as integral both at each point of its 
determination within the system and in the system itself. This 
cannot be well comprehended if the system is given an interpre-
tation in terms of classical logic. However the problem is solved 
when the system becomes a form of dialectics, a passage from 
the unmediated nature of a point to the mediation that totality 
gives: “the particular science is both knowledge of its content as 
existing object and acknowledgement – in this content – of the 
passage to its higher circle.” (Hegel 1970 b, 64). In other words, 
what the system accomplishes is a passage from the unmedi-
ated nature of thinking to its mediation, or, using the terms 
previously defined, from representation to concept. The concept 
of representations is actually their philosophic system, i.e. the 
process of placing them in coherence, freeing them from the 
singularity and exteriority that sets them to be unmediated 
forms of thinking.  
  To Hegel, philosophy is the modality par excellence of the 
“depositivization” of representation through concept, in other 
words it means “presenting” it to the testimony of the spirit. 
The Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion takes this issue even 
further in the sense of relating it to the horizon of the mystery 
mentioned above. At this point, the specification of the absolute 
religion (Christianity) as a revealed religion can be achieved 
starting from a clarification. The term Offenbarung has a dou-
ble use (Hegel 1993, 179-180): at the same time Christianity is 
a religion of revelation (offenbarte), as well as a religion that is 
revealed (offenbare). In the first case, revelation is a historical 
fact which is characteristic of the mode of the Christian truth: 
this is a truth of faith and not of the intellect, related to a spe-
cific historical moment and which thus a positivity that will be, 
as I will try to prove, the object of “speculative interpretation.” 
In the second case, the Christian religion is revealed in the 
sense that it is the full development of the essence of religion as 
such, the plenary religion, identical to its concept. Plenary, sub-
stantiated religion is, in this sense, a revealed religion. The two 
meanings combine when revelation – in its former meaning – 
becomes the spirit’s testimony through the philosophical exer-Ioan Alexandru Tofan / On the Possibility of Mystery. Philosophy and Esotericism 
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cise of the concept; the positivity, the historical character of 
Christianity becomes a point in the process of the spirit of re-
lating to itself. The Marheineke edition of The Lectures contains 
a synthesis of the versions of the lectures of 1824 and 1827. In 
an initial stage, revelation is seen as a manifestation of the 
spirit. “Being revealed is this primary division of the infinite 
form and it means to be determined, to exist for another; this 
manifestation of the self belongs to the very nature of the 
spirit.” (Hegel 1970 a, 193). However, the content of revelation 
is a totally different issue: on the one hand, it is manifold. Crea-
tion and dogma are instances of divine revelation. Therefore, 
revelation takes the form of positivity, as something that 
“comes” from elsewhere and is, through its very origin, of a 
nature other than human. On the other hand, as Hegel points 
out, revelation is its own object: seen as a manifestation of the 
spirit, it is, in fact, the form of the testimony of the spirit and 
not the origin of a truth which is different from this testimony: 
“What does God reveal if not that He Himself is this revelation 
of His being? What He reveals is infinite form.” (Hegel 1970 a, 
194). The importance of the philosophy of religion lies in this 
very identification between the two meanings of revelation; in 
other words, the disclosure of the fact that the entire dogmatic 
content of Christianity, initially a positive content par excel-
lence, is in fact the moment of founding the truth about God as 
spirit, whose essence is self manifestation. What I will try to 
demonstrate in the end of this section is precisely the manner 
in which Hegel manages to proceed to this identification, so 
that “the revealed content is that what is revealed (God as 
Spirit) is exactly what is for the Other and always for itself, at 
the same time” (Hegel 1993, 106). From this standpoint, for 
Hegel, revelation is complete. Therefore, Christianity, as a 
religion of the spirit, is neither a religion of truth, nor one of 
mystery: the revelation of the spirit does not allow any 
remainders, it is complete, while the truth reaches its full 
“expression” within this religion. Although it is questionable 
form a dogmatic point of view, the consequence drawn by Hegel 
is completely justifiable from the standpoint of the philosophy 
of spirit, which reveals itself to be identical to itself even when 
existing in The Other, having a fundamental determination to META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (2) / 2009 
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show itself. Therefore, in Hegel’s view as presented in the lec-
tures held in Berlin, philosophy as depositivation of representa-
tion ultimately leads to the theological “outcome” of a God who 
has nothing to hide.  
  
3.  Spirit and Truth 
  
  Paragraph no. 381 in the Philosophy of Spirit defines the 
spirit starting from the relation is has with nature. The 
strategy is the same as that of the Jena papers, where the spirit 
is defined by the relation with its opposite concept, that is 
nature. In an initial phase, The Encyclopedia deals with 
clarifying the systemic relations between the two: “To us, the 
spirit implies nature, since it is truth and, therefore, an 
absolute principle. Nature has disappeared from this truth and 
spirit has revealed itself as the Idea that reached the point of 
existing for itself, whose object and consequently subject is the 
concept.” (Hegel 1970 c, 17). The identity between Spirit and 
Idea, created through the mediation of suppressed nature is the 
most important element of this paragraph. Hegel defines the 
spirit in terms of the process, not of the substance, as a 
mediation of the Idea, a return of the Idea from its alterity, 
which is nature: in other words, the fundamental determination 
of the spirit is ideality, the process of reducing exteriority to 
interiority; the term is a translation of what is acknowledged in 
The Phenomenology of Spirit, namely Erinnerung. Seen from 
the standpoint of the relationship with nature, this ideality is 
seen as a negation, as a difference; however, from the point of 
view of the entire system, ideality is a manner of the 
affirmative, since it represents a return of the logical Idea to 
itself, the self-comprehension in relation to nature. Therefore, 
the philosophy of nature is not only a subjective attempt of 
reconstructing natural phenomena from the perspective of the 
spirit within the system, but also a description of the manner in 
which the Idea itself, while present in nature, suppresses 
“dispersion” as a form of the existence of nature. The 
philosophy of nature is a phenomenology of the Idea in nature, 
not a “re-definition”, a reconstruction of nature from the 
standpoint of the philosophy of spirit. Thus, the relationship Ioan Alexandru Tofan / On the Possibility of Mystery. Philosophy and Esotericism 
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between the three terms (idea, nature, spirit) becomes 
intelligible: it is a circular relation in which the last term, i.e. 
spirit, actually defines the circle itself, that is the “idealization” 
that allows the speculative relationship between the first two 
elements. The relationship that the spirit establishes with 
another form of its “exteriority”, namely history, radicalizes this 
result: “the spiritual activity is directed towards a subject that 
is active in itself – towards an object that has made efforts to 
rise up to what has to be accomplished through this activity.” 
(Hegel 1970 c, 23-4). The age is the one that creates the people 
who define and inform it, who give the specific goal to it, Hegel 
says. A consequence of these clarifications regarding the 
definition of the spirit is the fact that it is conceived in relation 
with the other instances of the philosophical system, as a form 
of circularity; in other words this is neither as a transformation 
of nature into something other than nature itself, nor as a 
transformation of logic, but as a “truth” of nature and logic, as a 
way of establishing a dialectic relation between them. Once the 
spirit becomes a mode of relation and not a resulting substance 
from the natural process, and the spirit thus designates the 
development of logical subjectivity so that it can recognize itself 
to be a form of concrete subjectivity, the question that rises is: 
how can the development of the spirit as such be understood, 
which is the most important element of Hegel’s pneumatological 
project? Hegel himself makes the request clear in the addition 
to paragraph no. 379: “Only when we consider the spirit in the 
self-realization of its concept can we genuinely know it and its 
truth; (for this is, in fact, the conformity between the concept 
and reality).” (Hegel 1970 c, 15). 
  Paragraphs 382-384 refer to the inference of the 
determinations of the spirit starting from its definition outlined 
in paragraph no. 381. The first determination is freedom: 
“Formally speaking, the essence of the spirit is, therefore, 
freedom, the absolute negativity of the concept as identity with 
itself.” (Hegel 1970 c, 25). As Hegel warns us, freedom cannot 
be conceived as a withdrawal from the relationship and as 
singularity, but on the contrary as the process of assuming the 
relationship, considered as a necessary point in the 
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speculative name given to freedom, can be achieved only within 
the other, not outside him. It is a result of the growth of the 
spirit, not its premise. And, consequently, freedom identifies 
itself with the truth of the spirit. Hegel repeats Christ’s words: 
“The Truth shall make you free!” which he re-writes as follows: 
“freedom makes it (the spirit, author’s note) true.” (Hegel 1970 
c, 26). The spiritual definition of truth will be discussed further 
on; for the moment, the result is that truth is identified as 
freedom of the spirit or, in other words, with the dialectic 
assumption of the relationship with the other. The crucial 
element of Hegel’s aforementioned pneumatological project thus 
becomes clear: it is about a demonstration of the necessity of 
the “path” of the spirit in relation with the various modes of 
exteriority, in other words, of its freedom. The “idealization” as 
a definition of spirit is identical with its freedom as a 
determination of the existence of the spirit in relation with its 
various alterities. 
  It is interesting to note how the problem of truth is 
brought about. Paragraph no. 379 defines it as in “conformity 
with the concept to reality”. Paragraph no. 381 further clarifies 
the matter by designating the actual modality of this confor-
mity: it is not established immediately, but it rather a dialecti-
cal reduction of alterity, a form of assuming the relation as a 
point of dynamic identity with itself. Paragraph no. 383 raises 
the problem in a new way: “The determination that is distinct 
from the spirit is manifestation.” (Hegel 1970 c, 27). Reality 
that is consonant with the concept of spirit, acquired by going 
through its factual hypostases, represents – in this new deter-
mination – the universal nature of the spirit which, existing for 
itself, is the process of making itself particular in relation with 
the various positivities. It is not a content whose form is the 
spiritual one that is revealed in the spirit, but the spirit itself, 
identical with itself in its particular manifestations. In other 
words, the spirit does not reveal something, it shows itself, “its 
determination and its content are the revelation itself” (Hegel 
1970 c, 27). The process of idealization becomes understandable 
from the perspective of paragraph no. 383, as the self-recogni-
tion of the spirit within the environment of its alterity; the 
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nomenological. “The particularization” of the spirit in its factual 
manifestations is, in fact, the process of revealing itself, as an 
essence or fundamental determination. The consequence is the 
re-delineation of the relation between form and content, which 
has been referred to in the present chapter. The central ele-
ment of this re-delineation is the idea of the unity between form 
and content, the fact that, from the standpoint of speculative 
philosophy, the absolute content is, in fact, its own manifesta-
tion as form. “Therefore, true content includes form in itself, 
while true form is its own content.” (Hegel 1970 c, 28). 
  Consequently, truth is defined as the full manifestation 
of spirit, as the unity between form and content, a unity that is 
seen as manifestation, in other words, a unity in which form is 
not external to content, but is its actual manifestation. From 
the standpoint of the philosophy of spirit, Hegel’s theory of 
truth becomes a theory of revelation or manifestation of the 
self. The theological example provided by Hegel is clear: the 
Son does not represent the organ of divine revelation, but the 
very content of this revelation, namely that the Father is 
differentiating Himself in the Son, and from this process of 
differentiation He returns to Itself as Spirit. The same context 
clarifies Hegel’s assertion that the Spirit represents the truth of 
nature and logic. When nature and logic are seen as forms of 
the spirit – i.e. as its manifestations, substantiations – they are 
conceived in truth, from the point of view of their real content. 
Similarly, defining absolute spirit as the unity between the 
concept of spirit and its reality – therefore as truth of the spirit 
or as its complete manifestation as a spirit, gives an interesting 
meaning to the term “absolute”; from the point of view of the 
hermeneutic framework that I have tried to present, this term 
has an important meaning: in this view, “absolute” corresponds 
to the mode of a complete manifestation of the spiritual content, 
the identity of spiritual form with spiritual content, its total 
transparency. Consequently, it is in fact identical with the 
meaning of the term “true” as a unity between reality and 
concept. 
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4.  Interpretation and the Reduction of Mystery 
 
  If a Hegelian concept of “interpretation” is accepted, it 
can be seen as being oriented towards the clarification of the 
content of representation and, therefore, towards the reduction 
of mystery, not towards its assumption and accretion. At this 
point, the paradigm still draws on the Enlightenment, as men-
tioned before. Hegel’s “interpretation” is not a subjective enter-
prise that can be summarized in a set of rules, it is a transfor-
mation of the object and it means bringing it into the position of 
being intelligible, comprehensible. Moreover, interpretation 
thus justifies (rechtfertigt) the object, finds a place in the hori-
zon of the truth. It is difficult to define this concept of interpre-
tation by referring to the acknowledged traditions of hermeneu-
tics, as they make Hegel reject his fundamental beliefs. This 
concept can be clarified through an analogy, for instance that of 
the mirrors reflecting themselves (R. Gasché), an indication of 
perfect transparency or of the mystical birth unto God as a sign 
of return to truth through the very tensed relation with its own 
boundaries. The locus of these phenomena, the process of clari-
fication as a result of self-confrontation describes somehow 
intuitively what Hegel suggests by his concept of interpretation. 
Unsuspicious through its very nature, Hegel’s interpretation 
starts from the presupposition of the initial clarity of the object 
and is defined as an approach through which this clarity is 
acquired again and assumed in the horizon of the finiteness of 
the world. 
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